Citation: Porter, K. J. (2006). Meaning, language, and time: Toward a consequentialist philosophy of discourse. West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press.

Summary:
Kevin Porter takes issue with language theory scholars or those who apply that theory without taking into account the ramifications of the relationship between time and meaning, explaining that meaning is dependent on temporality. The relationship between the sign and its consequences shows us the theoretical differences between "apriorism" and "consequentialism." Thus Plato's philosophy of forms where meaning preexists language and all other theories following a similiar interpreation of the relationship between meaning and language are rendered suspect. The changing of meaning over time confirms that meaning evolves from language in time, not preexists.

Response:
I really like the interdisciplinary approach that Porter uses. The criticisms that he addresses are those that I've often heard cited in the readings we did for Intro to Grad studies last semester.  Unfortunately, I felt that most of what Porter had to say wasn't different enough from the other theorists we've read to really capture my attention. His style and the amount of support and qualification he uses is different, but the theory seems and feels largely the same. I do like that he points out that the meaning of something is never complete since every reading changes the meaning over time, and the idea that a text can never be owned because the meaning can never be owned also seems very important. We've been talking about this concept in Authorship Studies recently.

Connections/Questions:  
-It's strage that Porter dichotomizes "apriorism" and "consequentialism." They don't seem like polar opposites. Apriorism says meaning proceeds language. Consequentialism says meaning comes in the future.
-Porter argues that local errors in writing shouldn't be attributed to faulty thinking on the part of the writer, but what about global errors? I can imagine an argument based on the premises that Porter lays out justifying that global errors are more so an issue of not extending the meaning making process far enough instead of faulty thinking.